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Abstract The nature of mystical experience has been hotly debated. Essentialists
divide into two camps: 1) immediate identity beyond any subject-object structure 2)
the mystical object maintaining some distinctness at the point of contact. Paul
Tillich’s mystical a priori has some affinities with the former, while William James’
model of religious experience coheres only with the latter. Opposing the essentialists
are constructivists. After noting some ironies of the constructivist position, this
article elaborates difficulties with 1) the traditional model of pure identity with the
divine by certain mystics, 2) the Tillichian universal mystical awareness, and 3) the
Jamesian direct perceptual model. Finally, it proposes that the human body and brain
mediate mystical experience, which consists of a distinctive sense of bodily harmony
conjoined with openness to the potentialities of an integrated environment, involving
distinctive neurological processes.
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Informed by William James and Paul Tillich’s respective understandings of mystical
experiences, this essay will venture into contemporary epistemological debates on
the nature of mystical experience. Over the past seventeen years of that debate no
less than eight articles focusing on mystical experience have marked the pages of the
Journal of the American Academy of Religion, the most widely circulated religious
studies periodical. In its critical-constructive work, this paper will ultimately offer an
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embodied model of such experience that attempts to mediate between two polar
positions. The essentialist pole maintains a metaphysical referent of mystical
experience, whether an object more or less distinct from the mystic or a reality
beyond any subject–object distinction. The constructivist pole insists that mystical
experiences have no referent beyond themselves and that the subjective or internal
impulse for such experiences is simply the mystic’s tradition-laden imagination or at
most some inchoate emotion. My proposal will side with the essentialists in positing
some common core to mystical experiences, while agreeing with the constructivists
that the content of these experiences is internal to the embodied subject. In addition,
I will offer essentialists some consolation in the absence of a direct experience of the
divine, by holding that this internal experience may still have certain metaphysical
implications. To conclude these preliminaries, I will say a word about the
perspective I assume in this essay, a perspective of ‘radical embodiment’ (see
Nikkel 2010): all our experiencing, knowing, and valuing radically rely upon our
perceptual, psychomotor, and emotive bodily engagement with the world, not merely
instrumentally but substantively. While our human bodies permit a wide range of
linguistic and other cultural practices, and indeed in some ways are shaped by these
practices, yet these practices fall within ranges determined by our bodies and realize
meanings grounded in them. A shaping of these practices by our bodies happens in
some sense ‘prior’ to their shaping of our bodies. This shaping and rooting in our
bodies, mostly tacit or prereflective, gets easily overlooked. Finally, permit me a
word about mediation. Essentialists uphold either mediation of an external object
through the mind (or perhaps mind and body) or no mediation at all if the mystical
referent stands beyond all subject–object distinctions. For constructivists, little to no
mediation pertains, insofar as the mystic constructs the experience from one’s own
imagination or perhaps from an inchoate emotion. Radical embodiment will judge
that mystical experiences entail a mediation by the body—with some commonalities
among these experiences—as well as at least a tacit correlation with the world.
To summarize the essentialists, I divide them into two camps: (1) those like W. T.
Stace, Robert K. C. Forman, and Jonathan Shear who claim that some experiences
are of immediate identity, undifferentiated unity, transcending completely the
subject–object structure (2) others like Bernard McGinn, Moshe Idel, and Henry
Simoni-Wastila who counter that any mystical experience must have some object not
identical with the mystical subject without remainder. As suggested just above, this
latter implies some mediation, though much of the normal mediation inherent in
human consciousness may drop away.
In their portrayals of immediate identity, Stace, Forman, and Shear emphasize the
purity of mystical experience, that is, its contentless nature. It is an experience of
nothing—no-thing—in particular, non-intentional in the sense of intending no
object. Forman labels it a ‘pure consciousness event (PCE)’ and Shear an
‘introspective mystical experience (IME).’ Shear goes on to describe it ‘as devoid
of phenomenological contents (sense perceptions, images, thoughts, emotions, sense
of individual identity, etc.) whatsoever’ (320). Earlier Stace wrote of ‘a kind of
consciousness which has no objects,’ ‘without any empirical content’ (82). Unlike
these three thinkers I would raise the possibility of our ordinary, everyday
consciousness occasionally lacking focus on any particular object, thought,
emotion, etc. Clearly, however, these essentialists intend something extraordinary
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about the nature of mystical experience. In ‘Mystical Knowledge,’ Forman does not
commit himself to any one interpretation of mystical experience as awareness per se,
as the ‘knowledge by identity’: the fact that ‘it is beyond all ordinary concepts and
language, leaves it open to a virtually infinite range of theories, explanations, modes
of expressions and descriptions’ (727). However, the mystics he cites consistently
interpret this experience as one co-extensive with the ultimate reality behind all
things. Following Stace, Shear sanctions bypassing the need for interpretation by
positing an ‘extrovertive mystical experience (EME)’ related to the introvertive,
delineated as ‘awareness of this same empirically contentless, abstract, transcenden-
tal ‘reality’ as underlying every object in one’s experience, external (trees, the sky,
etc.) as well as internal (thoughts, feelings, etc.)’ (320). Thus, they maintain or
assume a non-distinct or undifferentiated metaphysical reality or referent, even
though we cannot properly refer to any ‘object.’
Unlike the proponents of undifferentiated unity, the other camp of essentialists
stresses the metaphysical particularity and distinctness of finite human beings.
Simoni-Wastila puts it this way:
Human beings, who by nature are finite and limited in their metaphysical
boundaries, can never escape their particular natures. They cannot join with or
become undifferentiated from God’s creative oneness, unity, and simplicity
(858).
Thus Simoni-Wastila, along with McGinn and Idel, maintain some necessary
distinction between subject and object in mystical experience. In so doing, they
stand with most modern philosophy since Hume and Kant in insisting that
consciousness is always intentional, always of something. I will note here that
James’ model of perception of a wider consciousness normally subliminal to our
consciousness falls under the category of mystical experience as involving an object
rather than that of undifferentiated unity.
Before leaving this discussion of the essentialists, allow me to complicate things
further by introducing additional distinctions. Clearly the first camp posits an
undifferentiated experience of identity of human and divine beyond the subject–
object structure. Nevertheless, proponents of such experience typically do not hold
that this experience encompasses all of God’s or the divine consciousness. Divine
knowledge of the world represents a prime example of contents of consciousness
that mystics typically do not claim. (Interestingly, Simoni-Wastila demurs from
divine omniscience to ensure the ‘radical particularity’ of creatures, contending that
‘God cannot know our heart of hearts’ [860]). In a move towards monism, one way
to handle this possible discrepancy, as in neo-Platonism and Advaita Hinduism,
relegates divine knowledge of the world to lower knowledge. Nous (Greek, ‘mind’)
knows the Platonic forms and the World Soul the material world, while Saguna
Brahman comprehends the world according to Advaita Hinduism. The One of
Plotinus or Advaita’s Nirguna Brahman remains unsullied by lower knowledge,
experiencing only the higher knowledge of pure oneness, an experience the mystic
believes she or he shares.
While the devotee of unmediated identity traditionally holds that knowledge of
the world drops away in mystical experience, another option is theoretically
possible: Just as the divine in the opinion of some has both the knowledge of pure
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oneness and of the world, one could maintain that the mystic at one and the same
time has knowledge of undifferentiated unity with the divine at the highest level
along with some ordinary consciousness of its being in the world. In fact, that is
precisely Paul Tillich’s position. Therefore, Tillich’s thought has affinities with the
camp of undiffentiated unity over against those who uphold some subject–object
distinction—yet at the same time affinities with those who hold to some mediation.
Tillich insists on that point of ‘immediacy’ or ‘identity’ with the ultimate or uncon-
ditioned in all religious awareness in his ‘doctrine’ of the ‘mystical a priori,’ (1951:9,
1957:53, 70–71, 83; 1959:10, 16, 22–26), whether that experience be a cultivated
mystical state of substantial duration or not. (Indeed, to be human means one always
has this immediate connection with ultimacy, with the divine, if only in the
background and despite estrangement [1951:44–45, 1959:22–26].) On the other hand,
Tillich’s posited awareness of that which precedes the subject–object cleavage never
constitutes the whole field of any moment of human experience. Furthermore, a
mediation of sorts always pertains: in this life at least one never has an experience of
unity beyond subject–object without something within the subject–object structure of
the world becoming the vehicle or springboard for the experience. That is, something
finite becomes symbolic or revelatory of the infinite transcending subject and object.
As I have argued elsewhere, visual art provided that springboard for Tillich personally
(Nikkel 2006:17–21). Tillich asserts that even the mystic who presumes to leave
behind everything finite still relies on practices from one’s tradition (1959:28; cf.
1951:140). Yet because of the incidental1 nature of the specific content of the finite
that occasions mystical identity and because it is distinguishable from the awareness
of identity, this experience maintains its ‘purity.’ Thus Tillich believes he can have his
cake of immediate identity and eat his cake of finite mediation, too.
On the opposite side are constructivists like Steven Katz, Hans Penner, and
Wayne Proudfoot who maintain that no common core exists in mystical experiences,
either mediated or beyond all mediation. Rather, mystical experiences are wholly
constructed by the mystic out of his or her own religious tradition. Note that the
second group of essentialists above—‘distinction’ essentialists we might say—
allows for the possibility of some construction of the experience by the mystic,
though crucially insisting on objective contact with the divine. One could label them
as not simply essentialists but contextualists as well. ‘Constructivism’ as I refer to it
is thorough-going. Its assumption is both that no objective religious object exists to
be mediated and that the strictly subjective constructions are unique to each mystic.
So the mystic rather immediately experiences contents constructed by the
imagination. Therefore, either no mediated object internal to the mind obtains or,
in the case of Proudfoot, an inchoate emotive-physiological state receives linguistic
definition (Barnard:232–38).
Judging that the above brief overview will suffice for introducing the relatively
clear-cut constructivist position, I will broach an additional option before critiquing
constructivism. Simoni-Wastila, Martin T. Adam, and F. Samuel Brainard have
recognized various efforts to find a third way to ‘mediate’ the gap between
1 This does not mean that religious symbols are arbitrary for the individual believer. Rather that, in
principle, any portion of finite reality can become revelatory or symbolic depending on particular
circumstances.
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essentialists and constructivists. Brainard notes the strategy of some, like Michael
Sells on Western and Toshihiko Izutsu on Eastern mysticism, to acknowledge the
similarity of mystical texts while bracketing the ‘ultimate’ question of a common
core (361–62). However, such skimming of the surface, so to speak, merely
postpones rather than dissolves the question of a common core. Brainard also
mentions (388) and Adam describes a ‘family resemblance’ approach: ‘mak(ing) no
ontological claims . . . . It acknowledges family resemblances among the diversity of
experiences called ‘mystical’ while at the same time picking out for examination
subsets of experiences having similar descriptions’ (813). As with the approach of
noting textual similarities, though, this approach just postpones or ignores the
ultimate issue: Are mystical experiences just constructed from traditions by
individuals or is there a common core—or perhaps several common cores—behind
them? Brainard favors a tertium quid of his own centering on the paradox of certain
language about ecstatic experiences that allegedly both retains and collapses the
subject–object scheme (385ff). That is, Brainard maintains that mystical experience
paradoxically both upholds and transcends the subject–object structure and involves
both the metaphysical reality of a referent and construction by the experiencer. Looming
in the background is the ineffability of mystical experience, as Brainard assumes that
language cannot get beyond an either-or answer to the question of these polarities.
Brainard’s proffered solution represents the most interesting of these above
middle ways, while more recently Stephen Kaplan has developed yet another third
way. I will address each in turn. The plausibility of Brainard’s view rests on the truth
that any experience with non-linguistic elements can never be fully expressed
through language—so how much more might that pertain for an ultimate experience
of ultimate reality. Yet if we can bother to verbalize about mystical experience at all,
I would insist that we can say something about the manner and the extent to which it
transcends or blurs and to which it retains the subject–object distinction. The fact
that mystics’ own linguistic interpretations of their experiences disagree on whether
and to what extent this distinction remains, while belying any easy consensus on the
matter, at least supports the possibility of saying something relevant. Likewise, I
would insist that we can say something about whether mystical experiences are
wholly constructed by the subject or have some ‘objective’ reality behind them.
Brainard agrees with what James’ labeled the ‘noetic’ quality of mystical experience,
agrees that the mystic believes he or she is in touch with some ‘profound’ or ultimate
reality (376–79). But Brainard’s apparent contentment with leaving it there,
declining to verbalize about the nature of that reality, strikes me as a cop-out. A
constructivist would certainly feel no challenge to take mystical experiences
seriously on those terms—or lack thereof.
I will note that Tillich’s approach, in contrast to Brainard’s, specificies how the
mystic (or other religious experiencer) both uses and transcends the subject–object
scheme, both immediately experiences the ultimate reality and constructs symbols of
that reality.
Recently, Stephen Kaplan has attempted yet another way to overcome the
subject–object, constructivist-essentialist split. In one sense, it shares with the above
ways a postponing or bracketing of the question of the ‘objective’ reality behind
mystical experiences. I will conclude, however, that finally it reduces to an
essentialist model of undifferentiated unity. Unlike the above approaches, which
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refer to many or all types of mystical experience, Kaplan focuses upon one strand of
mystical tradition. Using Hindu Advaita texts, he highlights their recourse to words
that etymologically derive from the verb ‘to grasp’ (255–62). These texts regard
mystical experience as transcending such grasping as it reaches ‘a state of pure
consciousness without subject and object’ (260–62). Thus, in terms of my mystical
taxonomy, Kaplan would fall into the essentialist camp of such experience as
undifferentiated unity, where all else disappears. I will mention here that Kaplan
follows just one strand, hardly uncontested, of Hindu tradition, the ‘advaita’
(‘monism,’ or literally, ‘non-dualism’), championed by Shankara. Another major
tradition, ‘vishishtadvaita’ or ‘qualified non-dualism,’ championed by Ramanuja,
falls under my essentialist sub-category wherein some distinction between human
subject and God remains.
Examining the neuroscientific work of d’Aquili and Newberg (whom I will
further cite below), Kaplan invokes the left parietal lobe, with its ability to
distinguish graspable and non-graspable objects, as key for subject–object
experience (253–55). Moreover, in drawing on a range of neuro-research on sense
of self, Kaplan discerns an inverse pattern: Hypoactivation of the parietal lobes tends
to produce a state in which all becomes internal to or united in one’s ‘self’ or
‘subjectivity’—though not a self or subject distinguished from others; while
hyperactivation of the same tends to result in the (mis)attribution of one’s mind or
self to others, to objects, as in some forms of schizophrenia (249–53, 266–67).
Given my focus on embodiment, I appreciate his emphasis on grasping as central to
our experience of world.
Kaplan’s interpretive conclusions, however, leave me unconvinced. He claims
that neuro-scientific research and Advaita Hinduism entail no inevitable or necessary
contradiction, if one just refrains from ‘grasping at ontological straws.’ After all, he
explains, pure consciousness differs from, indeed is prior to, both our grasping
(human) subjectivity and physical objects. Therefore, Advaita need not fear neuro-
research, because whatever happens in our parietal lobes need not touch upon the
possible truth of pure consciousness or being (263–68). Yet, Kaplan’s tentative
claim—of the (possible) ultimate irrelevance of what occurs in human brains to
mystical truth beyond subject–object—assumes much epistemologically and
ontologically. Moreover, as Kaplan hints but wants to minimize, Advaita makes a
huge ontological (dare I say metaphysical) assertion. This ontological elephant in the
room seems to me to demand that we address its relationship to neurological
processes. Most crucially, for me the ‘hyper-evaluation’ of pure consciousness
undermines or denies the very significance or value of embodied consciousness in a
world. Another problem stems from Kaplan’s stipulation of the ultimate state of
being as absolutely transcending subject–object. In so doing he wants to avoid the
ontological commitment to an ‘idealism’ where ‘mind creates the world’ (267–68).
Yet this ultimate is a state of awareness or ‘consciousness, a state of pure
consciousness without subject and object, without beginning, middle, or end’
(261). So at the ultimate level of being and truth, only one self or subject exists—
while no object or physical reality does. While the common translation of maya as
illusion may misleadingly convey the total non-existence of the phenomenal world,
the status of the subject–object world of embodiment as lesser or lower reality and
truth, as suggested just above, devalues it. Moreover, additional ontological and
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epistemological questions arise: What is the relationship of the human subject’s
mystical experience to pure consciousness beyond subject–object? Does it even make
logical or ontological sense to speak of a human subject experiencing what transcends
all subjectivity and objectivity? For the human subject in a sense would seem to
disappear or merge into the absolute pure consciousness. Assuming the human
subject does momentarily complete this merger, is it plausible or even possible that
human memory, in the mode of subject–object, could recall an experience absolutely
not of subject–object? (Or a related question, would memory inevitably recall the
alleged experience as an object, even if it exuberantly claimed otherwise?).
The fundamental weakness of these above attempts at a tertium quid is this: they
do not help to resolve the debate unless and until they address what, if anything, is
mediated—or unmediated—in mystical experience. This brings us back to the
question of a common core. The apparent commonalities among many mystical
experiences seem to cry out for some common or similar core(s). Very similar
descriptions of experiences of pure consciousness beyond subject–object cut across
various traditions, as do depictions of mystical experiences of divine love.
Furthermore, beyond anecdotal evidence of the physiology and mental functioning
of meditative adepts, earlier scientific studies monitored the autonomic nervous
system (through pulse and blood pressure measurements) and brain wave patterns
(using electroencephalography [EEG]) during meditation while contemporary
scholars like Eugene d’Aquili and Andrew Newberg have imaged neurological
patterns in brain activity common to mystical states. I will caution that the meditative
states studied often did not result in reports of full-blown mystical states. Yet, these
meditative states showed some continuity with what we would commonly identify as
‘mystical’ states.
Let me summarize the scientific findings thus far. At least four brain areas appear
relevant to meditative, including mystical, experiences: the thalamus (involved in
integrative and non-specific functions), the limbic system (involved with emotions),
parts of the pre-frontal cortex, and the posterior sections of the parietal lobes
(referred to above by Kaplan). These latter two areas have the most prominent roles
in meditative experiences. The posterior parietal lobes house what Newberg terms
‘the Orientation Association Area (OAA)’ (2001). More specifically the left lobe
provides a spatial sense of self (which includes a sense of the graspable and non-
graspable as above), while the right defines the physical space in which the self
interacts. The pre-frontal cortex contains ‘the Attention Association Area (AAA),’
which focuses attention on intentional or goal-directed thought, actions, and
behavior (Newberg 2001). In particular, parts of the pre-frontal cortex show elevated
activity during thinking about or acting on social relationships (Monastersky). How
do cognitive neuroscientists learn what happens in the relevant parts of the brain
during meditative and other states? Expanding upon general conclusions from earlier
EEG studies, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) detects blood flow,
while positron emission tomography (PET) and single photon emission computed
tomography (SPECT) can also monitor metabolism and some neurotransmitter
activity.
While other areas of the brain undoubtedly also play a role in our sense of self, as
already indicated the posterior parietal lobes figure crucially. D’Aquili and Newberg
coined the phrase ‘the Unitary Continuum’ to refer to the degree of connectedness to
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others—or to put it conversely how sharply the self is defined over against others—
in various human experiences. On the ‘less connectedness’ side of baseline fall
certain pathological conditions, including depression. On the extreme of the ‘more
connectedness’ side falls what they identify as ‘Absolute Unitary Being’ (1999).
Newberg describes this state as one ‘where there is no perception of spatial or
temporal boundaries whatsoever, accompanied by the experience of absolute unity,
devoid of content and with even the self-other dichotomy obliterated’ (2001). (The
state of misattributing one’s subjectivity to an other with hyperactivation of the
parietal lobes, noted by Kaplan, does not fall under the d’Aquili-Newberg
continuum. One might regard this state as a blurring of the usual subject–object
distinction, but in the opposite direction.) D’Aquili and Newberg’s familiarity with
the model of undifferentiated identity of one essentialist camp is unmistakable.
Neurological studies so far have not been so precise as to distinguish definitively
among reported experiences of (1) undifferentiated unity versus (2) those of a unity
of love versus (3) those of ‘cosmic consciousness’ (as Newberg cites the well-known
experience of Richard Bucke of the universe as a living consciousness)—even as
individuals retain some sense of their individuality in the latter two varieties (2001).
Nonetheless, neuro-studies yield a consensus on reduced activity in the posterior
parietal lobes during meditative states, pointing to a diminished sense of self vis-à-
vis others or, put positively, a greater sense of connectedness and unity with others.
Inversely, the studies generally show increased activity in parts of the pre-frontal
cortex, apparently corresponding to focusing on relationships with others. In
experiences of undifferentiated unity, we seem to find enhanced focus but not on
any object in particular. Studies of the autonomic nervous system, as summarized by
Newberg, support the possibility or probability that this paradoxical condition
corresponds to the physiological extremes of meditative states. Some studies have
associated meditation with a relaxed state where the parasympathetic nervous system
kicks in and lowers heart and respiratory rates, blood pressure, and metabolism—this
would be the common wisdom. Other studies have suggested a more complex
picture of meditative states: heightened activity of the parasympathetic nervous
system can happen at the same time as heightened activity of the sympathetic
nervous system, the system associated with arousal (increased variability of heart
rate is one sign of this). As Newberg notes, this ‘fits characteristic descriptions of
meditative states in which there is a sense of overwhelming calmness as well as
significant alertness’ (2006).
When we move from physiological and neurological studies to a purported
genetic basis for the sense of spiritual connection, we slide on thinner ice. I share
with most other participants in the religion and science dialogue some skepticism
about Dean Hamer’s assertion of a ‘God gene.’ While he does acknowledge the
influence of culture and more personal environment on individuals’ spirituality, his
precise claim that genes account for half of the variations in degree of spirituality
strikes me and others as too quantitative and reductive for such a complex dimension
of human life. Despite my caveat, Hamer may be on to something regarding human
tendencies to construct a sharp sense of self versus tendencies to feel connected to
wider realities, which would have obvious implications for mystical experiences.
Specifically a variation of the gene VMAT2 in some individuals allows for greater
dopamine, serotonin, and noradrenalin effects, apparently on the pre-frontal area
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associated with relationships with others. This suggests that some persons have a
stronger proclivity towards unitive experiences than others. In general, this thesis
harmonizes with a 2002 neurological study cited by Newberg, indicating increased
dopamine activity ‘during meditation related practices’ (2006). In an interesting
negative example, decreased activity in this area seems to be associated with a
decreased sense of connection with others: A 1994 study showed decreased glucose
metabolism in murderers (Newberg 2001).
Thus both apparent similarities among mystical reports and diverse scientific
studies suggest some common or similar core(s) to mystical experience. Yet the
constructivist position, presented by Stephen Katz in his 1978 Mysticism and
Philosophical Analysis that launched the current debate, defies such apparent
similarities and scientific research. Hans Penner probably has stated these
constructivist ramifications most bluntly: ‘. . . mysticism now covers a host of
beliefs and experiences which have no relation to each other whatsoever’ (11).
Regarding the Kantian perspective in which Katz understands himself to stand,
Martin Adam has espied a peculiarity: for Katz no particular data or object is present
in mystical experience to interpret—the concepts of the mystic’s tradition are wholly
determinative for the contents of that constructed experience; so everything is
interpretation but ironically nothing pushes back on us calling for interpretation. I
will clarify here that if constructivists did postulate an ‘object’ for the mystic to
interpret, it would perforce be an internal object; by contrast Kant primarily deals
with external objects with respect to interpretation. For Kant noumena—objects in
themselves—are never experienced by an external reality; rather one experiences the
appearances of the object, namely, phenomena. For Kant, though, we perforce
unconsciously interpret objects through basic categories like space and time—and
noumena do constrain at the pre-conscious level what we will experience. The
conscious concepts of religious traditions constitute another layer of interpretation.
However, as Adam notes, not only the constructivists but some essentialists as well
conflate the two levels of interpretation, usually by reducing all interpretation to the
more or less conscious conceptual level (804ff.). I Not surprisingly Katz finds the
strongest support for his position of interpretation all-the-way-down in the difference
between claimed experiences of undifferentiated unity versus those where some
distinction remains between subject and object:
There is no intelligible way that anyone can legitimately argue that a ‘no-self’
experience of ‘empty’ calm is the same experience of intense, loving, intimate
relationship between two substantial selves, one of whom is conceived as the
personal God of Western religion and all that this entails (39–40).
Obviously my structuring of this article recognizes the validity and importance of
this distinction. However, noting a distinction between two basic types of experience
as conceptually interpreted—and perhaps a difference on the experiential level of the
degree to which a sense of self abides or departs—hardly denies the possibility of
similarities or common core(s) to mystical experiences.
We have seen the irony of the constructivist premise of no internal ‘object’ or
proto-object to interpret—or at least nothing that constrains interpretation. In a
further irony the constructivists end up with a position regarding the issue of
mediation similar to those who tout undifferentiated identity, for both maintain the
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strictly contentless nature of whatever, if anything, the mystic experiences prior to
interpretation. For the constructivist, the contents of the mystic’s experience all
come from interpretation. Of course, the identity essentialists hold that pure,
contentless, unmediated experiences occur apart from whatever interpretation may
come afterwards. Yet for both constructivists and identity essentialists, the mystical
experience itself mediates nothing—though for opposing reasons. For the construc-
tivist no internal object exists to mediate, or at most an utterly inchoate and
contentless emotive-physiological state. For the essentialist the mystic has an
unmediated experience of ultimacy beyond subject–object, beyond internality-
externality.
Speaking of mediation, the contemporary consensus accepts the mediated nature
of ordinary consciousness and experience. Before proceeding further in the tasks of
tackling critically and hopefully constructively mystical experience and mediation, I
will write more about my perspective of ‘radical embodiment,’ specifically on how
everyday consciousness is radically mediated by the body. Human consciousness is
embodied consciousness that evolved biologically for the sake of the organism.
Neuroscientists Antonio Damasio and Gerald Edelman theorize that consciousness
arises through brain mappings of one’s body in correlation to the environment. As
suggested earlier, while mappings in the posterior parietal lobes appear to play an
especially significant role in spatial orientation, many parts of the brain—with
mappings always in relation to the body I would add—figure in our sense of self.
Indeed, for Damasio and Edelman every perceptual sense involves mappings of our
bodies in relation to the environment. Both scientists conclude that all mammals
have a ‘basic’ or ‘proto’ consciousness that distinguishes self from others and the
environment. This is to say, a subject–object distinction—as well as a subject–object
correlation though not identity—enters in on the ground floor of biological
consciousness. Only humans have a higher consciousness that entails the ability
through language to objectify and reflect upon our sense of self. Damasio in
particular focuses on emotions or feelings as integral to the sense of self. Emotions
are first of all about the body and its state—though usually involving some direct or
indirect relationship to the social or natural environment. I find especially helpful
Damasio’s notion of ‘background body feelings’: In addition to stronger feelings of
say sadness or joy, we do have feelings about the state of various parts of our body,
not only on the surface or near-surface areas but also with respect to our viscera. It is
no coincidence for Damasio that ‘how do you feel?’ is a common question of
greeting. For persons with an integral sense of bodily consciousness, we
immediately become aware of a pain say in our big toe because of this constant
monitory awareness. These background body feelings, normally peripheral to our
focal consciousness, still inescapably color all our ordinary conscious experience.
Now we are ready to proceed further in considering mediation and mystical
experience. I will examine in turn three types of experiences: (1) the most radical: an
experience of the divine, circumscribed both in number of experiencers and in
duration, where all sense of ordinary subject–object consciousness drops away (2)
the Tillichian model with its ubiquitous immediate experience of the divine beyond
subject–object, albeit usually in the background, always accompanied by some
subject–object consciousness (3) the Jamesian model where some distinction
between human subject and divine object remains at every point.
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For the first type, radical and exclusionary in the sense that subject–object
consciousness completely rescinds, two possible models come to mind. Of course,
any serious scholar today acknowledges that normal consciousness always correlates
with neural activity. Nevertheless, at least a few dualists regard this correlation as
metaphysically incidental and inessential (for example, Eccles). This position is
compatible with the further theory that when the subject–object component of
consciousness, correlated with brain activity, fades away, pure consciousness, divine
consciousness, the deeper essence of consciousness unmediated by any neural
activity, remains. Whether or not anyone today explicitly advocates this theory, it
does accord with the mystical philosophy of Advaita Vedanta.
A more plausible model, however, holds that the brain does mediate an
experience of identity with the divine that completely transcends subject–object
consciousness. This model, in keeping with the results of neuroscientific research,
grants that various parts of the brain involved in ordinary consciousness de-
afferentiate or become quiescent. Notice what this model entails: those mediating
parts of the brain are utterly transparent to this pure divine consciousness. Though
normally involved in subject–object consciousness, they do not color or filter this
pure experience. Background body feelings (which Damasio contends we never
escape) in no way impinge upon this state of consciousness. That one may achieve
absolute knowledge unmediated by human language, culture, tradition, and bodies I
regard as an Enlightenment conceit. Or more precisely, the conceit assumes that such
human mediators have no effect on our knowledge—it assumes their absolute
transparency to their object.2 To say more about inductive evidence that mediation
affects all human knowledge is beyond the scope of this article. I concede the
theoretical or logical possibility of the complete transparency of some human brains
to a divine consciousness beyond subject–object. But I would note that the
supporters of this model carve out an exception to the way the brain otherwise
functions in knowing—albeit this alleged pure consciousness is an exceptional state.
One does not need to be convinced as I am that mediation makes a difference in all
knowledge in order to judge this model negatively. Those taking embodiment or
evolutionary biology/neuroscience seriously will likely find it implausible as well.
For if our brains evolved in conjunction with our bodies as biological organisms, the
evolution of brain structures able to function as a transparent conduit to a divine
consciousness seems improbable.
I will now consider the second scenario where an experience of undifferentiated
unity with the divine constitutes only part of one’s total experience or awareness. As
a reader of an early version of this essay put it, one may have a mystical experience
even as ‘the bodily feelings . . . just inevitably come along for the ride.’ Indeed,
Tillich’s ‘mediated, unmediated’ experience of the ultimate falls precisely under this
hybrid category: Humans have an awareness of ultimacy beyond the subject–object
cleavage that never constitutes their total awareness at any moment. When we
attempt to express this immediate awareness, we always invoke finite symbols.
Tillich’s mystical a priori then always combines with an a posteriori, in a kind of
2 Unwittingly, some radical postmodernists or poststructuralists end up reinscribing the error of the
incidental nature of these human mediators through an unbridled constructivism, though now there is no
external object to reach (see Nikkel 2010:13–19, 31–36, 81–82).
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synthesis reminiscent of Kantian epistemology. The pure experience of the divine
makes up part of an ‘impure’ total experience. In Tillich’s, as opposed to the first,
model, every fully capable human being has a mystical awareness as a component of
every experience, though it usually stays in the background. But why stop there?
Might not any animal with some awareness or consciousness have such an
experience? As the prius of all subject–object relations, logical consistency would
seem to suggest that, if one type of sentient creature experiences the divine, all do.
Obviously a mouse or lizard could not conceptualize or interpret its experience of
the mystical a priori. This fact points to an interesting issue: while Tillich
characterizes the identity beyond subject–object as contentless, this awareness is
associated with a sense of the unconditionedness of this divine reality. This
awareness has clear parallels in a Romantic intuitionist vein to Schleiermacher’s
‘feeling of absolute dependence.’ While this kind of awareness strikes one as more
general than particular or specific, one could well regard it as a type of content rather
than strictly contentless. The question arises: Does a feeling of unconditionedness or
of absolute dependence occur as part and parcel of the experience, or is it an
interpretation or (at least proto-) conceptualization, albeit intuitive? Since for Tillich
the mystical a priori comes with every human experience even when we fail to
consciously recognize it—and by extension probably with every creaturely
experience, I conclude that this sense of unconditionedness should involve some
interpretation—at least if Tillich consistently follows the logic of his mystical a
priori.
Admittedly, the above has been something of an excursion. But I will now cut to
the chase. What, if anything, mediates this universal awareness of the divine? We
could hypothesize that the mystical a priori simply bypasses our brains, as we first
did with the exclusionary or unmixed experience of identity beyond subject–object.
However, for Tillichian thought a theologically fatal objection arises: This
alternative more than smacks of the ‘supranaturalism’ anathema to Tillich. (Though
at least in this case of a universal mystical a priori sans bodily mediation, the
supranaturalism would be built into the structure or ‘pre-structure’ of the universe
rather than constitute an occasional intervention.)
The second possibility, again paralleling our consideration of the unmixed
experience, is that our brains mediate the mystical a priori—human brains and
mouse brains, though, in the latter case no conceptualization could ensue. Yet to
uphold the crucial element of transcendence of the subject–object structure, this
mediation must be completely transparent, as with the exclusionary model. We must
imagine then that the brains of all sentient creatures evolved so as to allow this
transparency. While theoretically possible, this seems more implausible than the
notion that only human brains happened to so evolve.
If my above arguments have proven effective, the reader will grant the
improbability of mystical experience with no mediation or with transparent
mediation, where all sense of subject and object vanishes. Yet what of those
mystical experiences, perhaps involving some images and/or some emotions,
perhaps involving a profound sense of divine love, where some distinction between
subject and object abides, even though much of the usual sense of separation has
evaporated? William James postulates a mystical experience involving our
perception of supernatural mind(s). His use of ‘perception’ is significant for it
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entails some retention of a subject–object structure. Still this perception is rather
direct. Our subjectivity remains and our brains still operate, though in an
unaccustomed way; but the fence at the margins of our consciousness comes down,
allowing us to experience the consciousness of another, which is normally
subliminal to us. This divine consciousness of which we become aware does itself
lie within the subject–object realm and thus has contents. However, our awareness of
it lacks specific knowledge of the contents. It is somewhat analogous to the memory
we sometimes have of a dream where all the details have vanished. (Interestingly,
James regarded several of his dreams as such an awareness of supernormal
consciousness.) Having outlined James’ postulation of direct human perception of a
divine mind when the fence confining our ordinary consciousness comes down, I
now raise the critical question of whether this model squares with his understanding
of human consciousness as a psychological and biological process. James himself
would see this as a legitimate question, as he regards all human and animal
experiences as instantiations of these processes.
James’ delineation of consciousness as a flowing activity is still standard in the
field of psychology. He noted both consciousness’ orientation to the general
environment or ‘streaming array’ as well as its recognition of particulars that satisfy
biological needs or drives (1890). James’ most basic theory of consciousness
therefore acknowledges its entailment of a subject aware of its environment and of
objects, some of the latter of which may be subjects in their own right. Since James
does not endorse undifferentiated unity, we have a preliminary consistency with
respect to his model of mystical experience. While James obviously did not possess
today’s knowledge of evolutionary development and neuroscience, he did uphold the
evolutionary adaptiveness of consciousness along with its biological nature. So how
might subliminal awareness of other consciousnesses that occasionally becomes
direct fit into James’ scheme? James of course just dealt with human awareness of
other consciousnesses, but I see no reason why it should not apply to other animals
given his assumptions. If awareness of other consciousnesses were both specific and
under the organism’s control, the survival advantage for some creatures is apparent:
for example, a mouse would find it most helpful to know of Tabby’s intention to
pounce. Unfortunately as we have seen, such awareness normally lacks specificity.
(Exceptions for James include automatic writing and mediumship where a
supernormal consciousness might transmit a particular message.) Also unfortu-
nately, the subliminal does not come into direct awareness whenever it would
benefit the organism. In addition, as with Tillich’s mystical a priori, awareness of a
supernatural consciousness would not prove beneficial to a non-human animal
unable to interpret or conceptualize it. Furthermore, according to James these
experiences sometimes prove negative due to the psychological make-up of the
subject and/or possibly due to the evil intentions of a supernatural consciousness.
Thus our discussion of the biological adaptiveness of mystical and related
extraordinary experiences on James’ model ends in ambiguity. More daunting,
however, as with experiences of undifferentiated identity, is the question of
mechanism. What perceptual sense or combination of senses—or any aspect of the
body and the brain, however intuitive—inputs these other consciousnesses? To my
knowledge James did not address this issue. Neo-pragmatist William Dean, however,
has. Given that the five senses are ‘in abeyance’ (James, 1902:424), Dean
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characterizes this direct perception as a bodily ‘non-sensuous perception.’ Further,
he claims that in general ‘what the body receives is mostly non-conscious, indefinite,
and neither transmittable to nor translatable by the senses or cognition’ (8). I agree
with the non-conscious nature of most of what our bodies input and would add that
the bulk of what contributes to our explicit knowledge is subconscious, tacit, and
indefinite—explicit cognition forming the tip of the iceberg. The controversial,
indeed if my intuition is correct, dubious, part concerns the assertion that we receive
input from outside our bodies not transmitted through our five senses that
contributes to cognition—in this case cognition of a divine consciousness. Granted
the jury is still out on at least one type of extraordinary sense perception, namely,
whether people can detect at a rate greater than chance when they are being observed
by another without any direct perceptual signals. That leaves us, though, with a
dearth of empirical evidence of extraordinary cognition of the consciousness of
another. Moreover, the lack of any candidates from contemporary scientific
knowledge for the bodily mediation of such experiences of the contents of other
consciousnesses definitely counts against the plausibility of James’ model—and
probably against other models—of mystical experience where some distinction
between human subject and divine object remains. On the face of it, this rather direct
transmission of the mental contents of one being to another appears more immaterial
or idealistic than bodily. Finally, one could resort to a supernaturalism tailored to
mystical experience where some subject–object distinction abides: God miraculously
works on the brains of mystics to induce whatever experiences God desires, but
leaves no physical evidence of this divine action in the external environment. This
would contradict Jamesian metaphysics, however, where even ‘supernatural’ forces
act within the laws and processes of the universe in the broadest sense.
James appended to his basic psychological model of consciousness a theory of
perception as initially ‘pure experience’ of a datum prior to subjectivity/objectivity,
mentality/physicality—which we then differentiate into subject and object (2003:1–
64). For James, unlike for unity essentialists, pure experiences are particular and
plural, despite a relative formlessness. Nevertheless, the sharing of the phrase ‘pure
experience’ with many mystics and scholarly proponents of undifferentiated unity is
somewhat suggestive. If true, James’ theory of perception would increase the
plausibility of direct experience of the supernatural. Unfortunately the whole thrust
of evolutionary biology in general, of the neurobiological theories of Damasio and
Edelman in particular, and of neuroscientific evidence thus far indicate that
consciousness evolved through the plotting of changes in the (relatively homeostatic)
body with respect to changes in the environment. As suggested earlier, our brains
map what occurs in our bodies, what occurs in our environment, and the correlations
between the two. This is to say once again that a subject–object distinction enters on
the ground floor of conscious perception (indeed built upon preconscious processes
of correlative representations of environment and organism).
Before advancing to my own constructive work on the nature of mystical
experience, I want to address a common argument for the reality of mystical
experiences of either the undifferentiated or differentiated kind: the sense of the
reality of the external object—or of that which transcends subject–object—by many
mystics. Newberg, though not a philosopher or theologian, addresses this issue from
a so-called ‘neuroepistemological’ perspective. He cites three criteria by which the
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brain might judge an experience as real: (1) ‘the subjective vivid sense of reality’ (2)
‘duration through time’ and (3) ‘agreement intersubjectively as to what is real.’ He
then concludes that the latter two collapse into the first (2006). I judge that he
dismisses duration and intersubjective agreement much too quickly. He gainsays the
former by noting that the brain structures one’s sense of time, with certain brain
injuries distorting one’s perception of time, while some mystics experience no sense
of time or duration at all. Yet we do have more objective scientific evidence that time
in any given spatio-temporal frame of reference passes at the same rate whatever our
subjective experiences. On the latter, undoubtedly some more or less instant
neurological criteria exist that enable us to consider some experiences and not others
as candidates for ‘reality.’ Nevertheless, intersubjective agreement constitutes a
powerful tool to judge the reality of experiences called into question. Thus I
conclude that a subjective sense of reality does not succeed as a strong argument for
the metaphysical reality of their object/‘non-object.’
From the above I obviously part company with both camps of essentialists. Yet, as
suggested earlier, both reports of mystical experiences and scientific research point
to some experiential and physiological-neurological common core to most mystical
experiences, both more emotive-imagist and ‘purer’ ones. I propose that the mystical
referent, though, is not an ‘external’ supernatural one—or one beyond internality/
externality, but more internal to our embodied consciousness. But what mediates
what in mystical experience? Larry Short makes a good start in theorizing that the
mediation in mystical experience is non-linguistic (though of course describing
the experience afterwards entails linguistic mediation) (664ff). Barnard also admits
the reality of ‘pre-linguistic’ or ‘trans-linguistic’ experience (242–43). Short suggests
that any experience involving ‘an interruption in the movement from signifier to
signified,’ where we ‘get hung up in between’—in other words involving
consciousness but not of any particular object, and which takes on religious
meaning is mystical (668ff). This strikes me, though, as insufficiently specific. Brief,
indeed momentary, everyday experiences where one loses awareness of object or
signified would not usually, if ever, incorporate a diminished sense of self let alone
unity with some larger reality. Mystical experiences by contrast, usually cultivated
and relatively sustained, do entail a change in sense of self. Some have hypothesized
that all religious experiences involve cross-modal translations of various perceptual
senses, thus promoting a unitive feeling (e.g., Winkelman). However, in many
mystical experiences the senses do seem to be in abeyance. Amy Hollywood in her
book, Sensible Ecstasy, highlights the frequent employment of erotic images and
language in the descriptions of medieval mystics and recommends the cultivation of
diverse forms of sensual experience. Also, in Roads of Excess, Palaces of Wisdom:
Eroticism and Reflexivity in the Study of Mysticism, Jeffrey Kripal notes that erotic
love in general diminishes the sense of a separate self as it increases the sense of
unity with another (12). However, I would note crucial dissimilarities of ordinary
erotic experiences from mystical ones: in human sexual experiences pronounced
physiological changes occur in certain parts of the body and the brain, while the one
with whom one unites is a particular finite individual. With respect to the brain,
Newberg notes similarities between orgasmic and unitive states, but also significant
differences: the hypothalamus appears to play a more prominent role in sexual
climax, while cortical frontal lobes take a more active role in mystical states
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(Horgan). In Sacred Pain: Hurting the Body for the Sake of the Soul, Ariel Glucklich
considers the role of pain in stimulating certain religious experiences. Glucklich
argues that pain can break down the sense of self, thus opening one up to a sense of
unity with the sacred (e.g., 207). Without disagreeing with that assessment, I would
observe that pain bears no necessary or unique relationship to mystical experience.
On the one hand, overwhelming pain sometimes simply dissolves the sense of an
integrated self, leaving one incapable of reintegration with a larger reality or
meaning. On the other hand, most mystical experiences have not involved pain as a
method to achieve greater unity.
The above theories on mystical experience have the advantage of highlighting our
embodied nature. And except for Short’s account they rightly highlight a lessened
sense of a distinctive self to the benefit of a greater sense of unity with the other as
crucial to mystical experience. I will now advance an embodied version of mystical
experiences wider in some ways than any of those accounts, yet still circumscribed:
Its object is not as definite as in cross-modal or erotic experiences, nor is pain a
necessary preliminary object, yet its content differs in kind from any mundane
experience where one momentarily loses awareness of any particular object.
Mystical experiences consist of a distinctive sense of bodily harmony conjoined
with a general openness to the potentialities of an integrated environment—thus
their expansive and unitive quality. A lessening of the sense of one’s self as simply
separate and distinct from others and a concomitant upsurge in the sense that one
forms part of a larger reality along with other particular realities constitute a key
part of the distinctive quality of this type of experience or state. This state involves
distinctive neurological processes, referred to earlier, about which our scientific
knowledge continues to grow. Such experiences may be, and historically
sometimes—indeed often—have been, interpreted as escape from our world to
an otherworldly reality. But a better interpretation is available: The special sense of
openness to unity with an other typical of mystical experiences can instead lead to
a deep sense of harmony and empathy with our fellow human beings, other living
creatures, as well as with the divine ultimate reality construed in various ways by
the world’s religions. Indeed, from the perspective of radical embodiment,
background feelings of our body remain in mystical experience, albeit more in
the background than usual. And these color the precise character of human
mystical experiences. So the best interpretation of such experiences involves the
desire to remain embodied in a world symbolized as the body of the divine in
harmony with all embodied creatures.
Before concluding let me review and summarize the reasons and arguments I
cited against the essentialist positions: Human (and other animals’) bodies and brains
evolved in order that biological organisms might flourish in natural (and social)
environments. This entailed some distinction between subject and object on the
ground floor of sentience or consciousness. While one cannot rule out a priori the
possibility of human or other animal brain structures evolving with a transparency to
the divine consciousness, this is unlikely given the more ‘translucent’ mediation of
object by subject that pervades conscious life. Regarding essentialists who maintain
some distinction between mystic and the divine, implausibility lies in the empirical
lack both of (1) identifiable brain and body structures or mechanisms to tap into the
divine consciousness and (2) evidence that organisms gain awareness of the
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consciousness of other organisms apart from perceptions and reflection upon them.
What of the mystic advocating unmediated identity who claims that the reduced
sense of distinction of self from other which I posit in mystical experiences can reach
the point where sense of self disappears and that what remains is precisely divine
consciousness? I would first refer back to the general non-reliability of subjective
certainty in such matters. More particularly, I would suggest that the mystic is
probably misreading her or his experience, given what we know about the nature of
human and animal consciousness. Finally, this model of identity of consciousness
without remainder creates metaphysical problems cited with respect to Kaplan.
Undoubtedly for some, my denial of unmediated or direct connection with the
divine concedes game, set, and match to the constructivists. Yet given other reasons
discernible from our bodily being in the world that validate the truth of the purposive
interconnection of all life within the span of an ultimate reality, why should we not
value mystical experiences so interpreted? After all, epistemologically speaking,
James and Tillich both hold that mystical experiences never yield specific
information about the divine: Tillich because of his espousal of the universal
mystical a priori and James because we finally cognize only a holistic sense of the
co-conscious enveloping divine rather than any particulars. And of course James’
pragmatic concern with moral fruitfulness invites us to value mystical experiences
whatever their ultimate cognitive status. We no longer live in or under the influence
of a Romantic age that assumed a direct connection with the divine at the level of
intuition or feeling. But the varieties of mystical experience that captivated William
James and Paul Tillich may stimulate us to imagine more bodily connections with
the divine for a postmodern age.
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